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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) currently insures
bank deposit balances up to $100,000.According to some observers,statu-
tory protection creates moral hazard problems for insurers because it
allows banks to engage in risky activities.As an example,moral hazard was
a key contributor to huge losses suffered when thrift institutions failed
during the 1980s.
This brief by Konstas outlines a plan to reduce the risk of government
losses by replacing insured deposits with uninsured deposits and eliminat-
ing some of the costs of deposit insurance.His plan proposes a self-insured
(SI) depositor system that places an intermediary between the lender
(saver) and borrower (bank) in the credit-flow chain. The FDIC would
guarantee saver loans and allow the intermediary to borrow at the risk-free
interest rate if the intermediary’s bank deposit is statutorily defined out-
side the realm of FDIC insurance. The risk is therefore transferred to
depositors (intermediaries); thus creating incentives for depositors to earn
a rate of return at least equal to the cost of borrowing plus a risk premium
based on the risk profile of banks.
Konstas’s plan uses the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) as a finan-
cial model but  replaces the Office of Finance (OF) with a Self-Insured
Depositors’ Financing Office (SIDFO). His plan creates additional advan-
tages, such as maximum funding efficiency (e.g., economies of scale), and
there is virtually no risk of loss for the U.S. government. The shift of guar-
antees from bank debt to SIDFO debt would dramatically decrease the
FDIC’s odds of losses from bank failures.
Konstas expects that intermediaries handling large funds would be apt
to invest in SI certificates of deposit (CDs) and to leverage capital for the
sake of rate spreads. These intermediaries would become SI depositors
because they would have the option of raising funds at rates equal to
Preface
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SIDFO’s cost of borrowing and they could earn wider interest-rate spreads
on investments than they could by raising funds on their own.
The advantages for lenders (savers) and borrowers (banks) that switch
their status from FDIC-insured depositors to SI depositors depend on cap-
ital requirements, the SIDFO lending rate, and the spread between the
lending rate and the rate on existing accounts.Konstas notes that the unin-
sured SI depositors would need to adjust their returns for the risk of bank
failure. He also notes that accounts with interest rates above the SIDFO
lending rate would have the incentive to convert to SI deposits.Using 1998
Call Report data to compute interest-expense ratios for time and savings
deposits, Konstas estimates that approximately 10 percent of all funds in
the U.S. banking system would convert to SI CDs.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
January 2006   
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Introduction
Although deposit insurance protects depositors against loss, it also creates
moral-hazard problems for the insurer. “Moral hazard” is the tendency of
those with insurance to take less care and put forth less effort to avoid risks
than they would if they had no insurance. Deposit insurance therefore
allows banks that engage in riskier activities to obtain insured deposits at
risk-free interest rates, since all costs of bank failure fall on the insurer.
Another aspect of moral hazard is that insurance often provides a motive for
bank managers,especially when threatened with insolvency,to take on addi-
tional risks.Empirical studies show that moral hazard was a key contributor
to the huge losses suffered when thrift institutions failed during the 1980s.
1
Some observers believe that regulators can sufficiently contain the
moral-hazard problem by increasing bank regulation and surveillance,off-
setting moral hazard with financial penalties for excessive risk taking,
requiring banks to hold more capital, and intervening sooner at failing
banks to minimize losses. Others, however, have asked whether the moral-
hazard malady may not in fact reflect the inherently destabilizing effect of
deposit insurance protection—an effect that can be countered only if the
protection itself is removed or drastically reduced. This brief looks at the
problem and offers a solution in the context of the latter view.
There are two kinds of deposit protection—statutory and implicit.
Statutory protection occurs when the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) insures deposit balances up to a certain amount,cur-
rently $100,000. Implicit protection occurs when regulators resolve bank
failures at no loss to any depositor, and when banks become insolvent but
are not allowed to fail. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) attempted to limit this type of
protection, basically by making it harder for regulators either to use 
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failure-resolution policies that protect uninsured depositors or to invoke
the too-big-to-fail argument during a failure.
2
The argument for removing implicit deposit protection is that if
depositors consistently suffer losses during failures, they will become sen-
sitive to the actions taken by their depositories and will require premiums
according to risk.Such an outcome would dull banks’incentives for undue
risk taking because higher risk would translate into higher premiums for
uninsured funds.
This brief suggests a way to reduce deposit protection—not by affect-
ing the implicit protection for deposits above $100,000 (as FDICIA did),
but, instead, by affecting the statutory type of protection for deposits
below $100,000. Specifically, this brief outlines a plan that would make it
advantageous for banks to replace some of their insured deposits with
uninsured deposits.The brief compares the existing credit-flow chain with
what the chain would be under the proposed plan; explains how the
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system is the financial model for the
proposed plan; defines the population from which the new self-insured
depositors would be drawn;sets the parameters and criteria for conversion
to self-insurance; calculates the amounts likely to be converted; and pro-
vides specifics on the benefits to be conveyed and the risks to be curtailed.
The Federal Credit-Flow Chain 
To understand more fully the problems and limitations of FDIC insurance
and the ways that my plan would address them,consider first the two types
of federal credit-assistance—direct loans and loan guarantees. Both types
are evident in the program for student loans: the government can offer a
loan directly to a student,or it can guarantee a loan that another party (e.g.,
a bank) has made to the student. In terms of risk exposure, there is no 
difference between the two,for if a given lending is structured half as direct
loan and half as loan guarantee and the student later defaults, the govern-
ment will lose equally on each half.The budgetary effects of these programs
are also similar: federal spending (outlays) and the deficit (or surplus)
increase by the amount of the net cost to the government (defined as the
present value of expected disbursements over the life of the loan less 
the present value of expected collections) for both direct loans and loan
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guarantees.But the impact on the national debt of the two programs is dif-
ferent.Under direct loans,the national debt would rise by both the net cost
amount and the amount of U.S. Treasury borrowing that is necessary to
finance the direct loan; whereas the debt would rise by the net cost figure
only with guarantees. Furthermore, there is a cost disparity between funds
that the government provides and funds that it merely guarantees. When
the government borrows funds to provide for direct loans or other outlays,
it does so by using the central financing mechanism of the U.S. Treasury;
i.e.,it raises funds in large amounts at a time,in highly liquid securities,and
totally on a risk-free basis,thus ensuring that the needed funds are raised at
the lowest cost possible. In contrast, when banking institutions raise funds
to make guaranteed loans,they proceed by issuing types of debt obligations
that vary in size, risk, and marketability. Often, raising the funds involves
the use of branch offices. As a result, the cost of funds to institutions mak-
ing guaranteed loans is significantly higher than the government’s cost of
funds in making direct loans. For the borrower, this difference in cost of
funds means lower costs under direct loans than under loan guarantees. To
minimize the discrepancy, the government has instituted central financing
mechanisms that copy the model of the Treasury for most loan-guarantee
programs under its auspices.In the case of student loans,the central mech-
anism is the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae). Through
Sallie Mae, banks can raise funds for student loans almost as cheaply as if
they borrowed the funds from the Treasury at cost.
Federal deposit insurance is a loan guarantee program.
3 It guarantees
that the money a depositor loans to the bank will be repaid by the insur-
ance fund, up to the statutory limit, if the bank is unable to make pay-
ments. Deposit insurance therefore shares the traits of other loan
guarantee programs: insured deposits do not count as outlays in the U.S.
budget, nor are they included in the national debt; only the net disburse-
ments to fund losses and purchase assets of failed banks are recorded as
federal outlays and enter the national debt total.And in terms of risk expo-
sure,the government assumes as much risk by insuring deposits (loans) to
banks as it would have if it had made the loans directly to banks out of its
own funds.However,unlike other loan guarantee programs,deposit insur-
ance has not devised a central financing mechanism to enable banks to
raise funds more economically.
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How the current system of deposit insurance works is depicted in
panel A, Figure 1. The government, via its agency, the FDIC, guarantees
loans that savers (depositors) make to banks.Since government assumes all
the default risk,the bank gets to borrow money at the risk-free interest rate.
To compensate for the assumed risk,banks must pay assessment premiums
sufficient to cover insurance losses and FDIC operating costs and to main-
tain the reserve fund at a mandated ratio. These are flat-rate premiums for
all banks in a particular risk category, and may or may not match the
underlying risk in a bank’s activities.This means that some banks are over-
paying for deposit insurance whereas others are underpaying.
As noted above, a major flaw in this system is the moral-hazard prob-
lem. Moral hazard can emerge because the insured depositors lack a
motive for monitoring the viability of their depositories, or because some
bankers who are already benefiting from underpriced assessment premi-
ums may decide to further exploit the advantage by taking on even more
risk. Either way, increased risk ultimately means more bank failures and
greater losses for the insurer.
To minimize the moral-hazard occurrence and at the same time make
bank funding more cost-efficient,I propose a plan that is outlined in panel
B, Figure 1. This plan is not designed to replace the present system or to
limit the FDIC in any way. The FDIC would continue to insure deposits
(other than those of the proposed plan) up to the legal limit, and would
retain its existing supervisory and regulatory authority and functions with
respect to insured banks. In addition, the banks’ participation in the pro-
posed system would be an option, not a requirement.
The difference between my plan and the current system is the placing
of an intermediary in the credit-flow chain, with the initial lender (the
saver) serving as lender to the intermediary and the intermediary serving
as lender to (depositor in) the bank.The FDIC would guarantee the saver’s
loan to the intermediary to the effect that if the intermediary could not
repay its debt, the FDIC would repay it. This guarantee would enable the
intermediary to borrow at risk-free interest rates.But the guarantee would
also dictate that the intermediary’s deposit at the bank be statutorily
defined outside the realm of FDIC insurance. This constraint means that
the deposited funds would remain at the bank at the depositor’s own risk.
I call these depositors “self-insured” (SI) depositors. To ensure that SI
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Figure 1 Current and Proposed Insurance Systems
A.  Current System
1.  FDIC guarantees (assumes default risk for) the saver’s loan to bank.
2.  Saver lends to (deposits funds in) bank at the risk-free rate.
3.  Bank pays the FDIC an assessment premium.
Shortcomings:  Moral-hazard problems; small-deposit funding of banks.
B.  Proposed System of Self-Insured Depositors
1.  FDIC guarantees (assumes default risk for) the saver’s loan to SI depositor.
2.  Saver lends to SI depositor at the risk-free rate.
3.  SI depositor lends the bank the loan proceeds plus equity at own risk; charges 
 b a nk own cost of funds plus a risk premium. 
Advantages: Bank risk priced into bank’s cost of funds; incentives for depositor discipline; 
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depositors are able to meet the “own-risk” obligation, they would have to
combine a certain amount of their own money with the money they bor-
rowed, so that if the bank in which the package was deposited failed, it
would be the depositor’s money that was used up first to absorb losses
before loss spilled onto the guarantor of the borrowed portion. To remain
viable,SI depositors would need to earn a return at least equal to their cost
of borrowing plus a risk premium based on the risk profile of the bank.
An Example Comparing the Current and Proposed Plans
To see how this would work, suppose that you have $80,000 and I have
$40,000. Under the present system, if we each deposited our money in an
account at an FDIC-member bank, both accounts would be insured and
both would be entitled to compensation at the risk-free interest rate plus a
premium based on the size of the accounts, given that larger accounts
embody greater economies of scale for the borrower. There is widespread
evidence that larger accounts attract higher rates. Banks routinely present
this information in their lobbies, in newspapers, or on the Internet. Table
1 is an example of interest rates paid on certificates of deposit (CDs), as
advertised in a bank’s website on July 17, 2000.
On this basis and given the same time to maturity, assume that the
bank will pay 4.10 percent on your account and 4.00 percent on mine. In
the proposed plan, however, we would have the option of lending to each
other under the same guarantee that we now have at the bank. That is, if
you loaned me your $80,000 and I agreed to certain conditions, the FDIC
would guarantee that it would repay your loan if I could not repay it.It fol-
lows that, since the guarantee would be the same, you would be willing to
lend me the money for the same interest rate that you would lend money
to the bank. The conditions to which I would have to agree would be (1)
deposit the loan proceeds at an FDIC-member bank, and (2) do so at my
own risk. To fulfill the second condition, I would be required to combine
some of my own money with the loan proceeds and invest both parts in
bank deposits. The FDIC would say how much of my money would be
combined with the loan. If all $40,000 were needed, that would mean that
I could finance a $120,000 deposit asset with one-third equity and two-
thirds debt—a capital-to-assets ratio of 33.33 percent. Since SI accounts
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would not be eligible for FDIC coverage,all of the $120,000 would be sub-
ject to loss in case of default. Thus, if the bank with the money failed and
depositors were subjected to a loss of, say, 10 cents per dollar of deposit, I
would lose $12,000, all of which would be taken from equity. (In contrast,
if $120,000 was deposited under current FDIC rules, the depositor’s loss
would be $2,000 and the FDIC’s loss would be $10,000.) If the loss was
33.3 cents per dollar, the entire capital would be wiped out, although
enough would still remain in my account to pay off the loan.But if the loss
exceeded 33.3 cents—if it was, say, 35 cents—what would be left in my
account would not be enough to pay the loan, and the FDIC would be
called upon to make good on its guarantee and cover the deficit between
the loan value ($80,000) and what remained in the account ($78,000).Still,
the $2,000 loss would be less than the $35,000 that the FDIC would have
lost if the $120,000 account had been insured.
Why would I want to undertake the loan under these conditions? If I
put your money and mine as a sum in a single account, the bank would
pay more on that account than it would on separate accounts.Assume that
the bank would pay 4.15 percent on the larger account. I would then be
Account Size ($)
Table 1  Relationship Between Account Size and Interest Rates on 
Certificates of Deposit (in percent) 
CD 1,000– 10,000– 25,000– 50,000–  75,000– 100,000– 250,000– 500,000 
Maturities 9,999 24,999 49,999 74,999  99,999 249,999  499,999  or  more
3–6 months 5.45 5.50 5.55 5.60 5.65 5.70 5.75 5.80
6–9 months 6.00 6.05 6.10 6.15 6.20 6.25 6.30 6.35
9–12 months 6.05 6.10 6.15 6.20 6.25 6.30 6.35 6.40
1–2 years 6.50 6.55 6.60 6.65 6.70 6.75 6.80 6.85
2–3 years 6.50 6.55 6.60 6.65 6.70 6.75 6.80 6.85
3–4 years 6.45 6.50 6.55 6.60 6.65 6.70 6.75 6.80
4–5 years 6.40 6.45 6.50 6.55 6.60 6.65 6.70 6.75
5–6 years 6.35 6.40 6.45 6.50 6.55 6.60 6.65 6.70
Source: www.pffbank.com/rates/rates.html.14 Public Policy Brief, No. 83
able to increase my return both because I would earn more on my own
money (4.15 percent instead of 4.00 percent) and because I would realize
a positive spread between what I would pay you (4.10 percent) and what
the bank would pay me (4.15 percent) on the money I had borrowed.Since
I would be financing the deposit asset at the ratio of $2 of debt for each
dollar of equity, the return to equity would be 1(0.0415) + 2(0.0415 –
0.0410) = 4.25 percent, or 25 basis points more than I would have made if
I had invested just my money alone.
Of course,the additional return would have to be weighed against the
loss that I would incur if the bank failed. How much of a loss could I
assume and still justify the borrowing? The equation for such loss (x) is
1(0.0415 – x) + 2(0.0415 – 0.0410 – x) = 0.040. In this case x = 0.00083.
This means that if I thought the risk of failure with a loss to depositors of
less than 8.3 cents per $100 of deposit was small (less than 50 percent),
becoming an SI depositor would make sense; otherwise, I would be better
off as an FDIC-insured depositor at a 4.00 percent rate.
Suppose now that you, with $80,000, are the SI depositor and I, with
$40,000,am the lender.Under the 33.33 percent capital-to-assets ratio,the
$80,000 of equity could support $160,000 of guaranteed borrowing for an
SI deposit of $240,000. Assume that the bank paid 4.20 percent on this
(larger) SI deposit. In borrowing the $160,000, you would have as one
alternative the borrowing of $40,000 from me at a cost of 4.00 percent and
the borrowing of $120,000 from another lender at a cost of 4.15 percent
(thus bringing your average cost of borrowed funds to 4.11 percent). The
return to equity then would be 1(0.0420) + 2(0.0420 – 0.0411) = 4.38 
percent, or 28 basis points more than you would make as an insured
depositor. The higher return would enable you to attain a higher break-
even point between SI and insured deposits than was feasible in my case.
Solving the equation 1(0.0420 – x) + 2(0.0420 – 0.0411 – x) = 0.0410 
for x produces a value of 0.00093, meaning that the bank could fail with 
a loss to uninsured creditors of up to 9.3 cents per $100 of deposit (com-
pared with 8.3 cents in my case) and you would realize the same net return
you would have as an insured depositor. Since the likelihood of the 
bank failing with a 9.3 cents loss is more remote than it failing with an 8.3
cents loss, you would be more apt to invest on a self-insured basis than 
I would.
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Consider now that after borrowing my $40,000 at a cost of 4.00 percent,
you borrowed the rest in separate $40,000 blocks from three other lenders
like me at the same cost. The return to equity would now be 1(0.0420) +
2(0.0420 – 0.0400) = 4.60 percent, or 22 basis points higher than if you had
borrowed the $120,000 in a lump sum. The higher return would raise the
break-even point for SI deposits. Solving the equation 1(0.0420 – x) +
2(0.0420 – 0.0400 – x) = 0.0410 gives a value for x of 0.00167.You could now
justify investing in SI funds even if you assumed a possibility of failure with
a loss to depositors of up to 16.7 cents per $100 of deposit.
4
The Federal Home Loan Bank as a Financial Model
As discussed above, each SI depositor would be borrowing separately in
order to raise the needed funds. In terms of earnings, smaller depositors
would be at a disadvantage to larger depositors because of the economies-
of-scale limitation.Another limitation that would be incurred under indi-
vidual borrowing is that each SI account could remain self-insured only up
to its capital, leaving the FDIC (as the guarantor of the SI depositors’
lenders) responsible for losses in excess of that capital.
These problems could be overcome if each depositor borrowed the
funds through a central financing facility rather than borrowing the funds
by themselves.Such a “Self-Insured Depositors’Financing Office”(SIDFO)
would issue securities in amounts to meet the needs of all SI depositors
(see panel A, Figure 2).
The FDIC would guarantee the lenders (the buyers of the securities) 
to SIDFO against default, and this guarantee would enable SIDFO 
to raise its funds at risk-free rates. The funds raised would serve as loans
to SI depositors after they post the required capital. The SI depositors
would use the proceeds (together with their capital) to buy CDs. The
CDs could be in maturities as needed by the banks. (As an example 
of how a bank might seek to structure its borrowings, see Table 1.) This
would tend to minimize SIDFO’s interest-rate risk. SIDFO’s lending rate
to SI depositors would be based on three factors: SIDFO’s own cost 
of borrowing, the expenses of operating SIDFO, and the costs during
failures when the loss exceeded the SI depositors’ equity. The third fac-
tor would render SI accounts wholly self-insured.
5 The SI depositors’
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 1 .  F D IC guarantees (assumes default risk for) the saver’s loan to SIDFO.
 2 .  S a ver lends to (i.e., buys securities of) SIDFO at the risk-free rate.
 3 .  S I DFO lends to SI depositor at cost (risk-free rate) plus own operating 
expenses and excess loss from insolvent SI depositors.
 4 .  S I  depositor lends to bank at own risk; charges bank own cost of funds plus 
a risk premium.
 A d ditional advantages: Better system implementation; maximized funding efficiency (economies 
 o f  scale) on both borrowing and lending sides; virtually no risk of loss for the government.
 B . Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System
 1 . Government implicitly guarantees the saver’s loan to OF.
 2 . Saver lends to (i.e., buys securities of) OF at near risk-free rate.
 3 . OF lends (transfers funds) to Federal Home Loan Bank at cost (near risk-free rate).
 4 . FHLB makes secured (collateralized) loans to thrifts or banks; charges thrift or bank own 
cost of funds plus own operating costs, OF costs, and costs for FHLB regulator.
 D i sadvantages relative to SI system:  No incentive for market discipline; risk premium not included
 i n  bank’s or thrift’s cost of funds; failure losses shifted to government (FDIC); more government  
 i n frastructure and regulation; higher cost of funds for thrifts and banks.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
lending rate to a bank would include their cost of funds plus a perceived
risk premium.
The FDIC-sponsored SI-depositor system would parallel the financial
model of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs).Panel B,Figure 2 is a chart
of the FHLB system.In that system,the guarantee is effectuated through the
government-sponsored enterprise status of FHLBs, which allows them a
$4.5 billion line of credit from the U.S. Treasury. The FHLB equivalent of
SIDFO is the Office of Finance (OF). The OF sells (through a network of
underwriters and discount dealers) and services consolidated obligations
(bonds and discount notes) to fund the operations of all 12 FHLBs. The
bonds and notes are the joint-and-several liabilities of all FHLBs: if any par-
ticular FHLB becomes insolvent, the remaining FHLBs have to pick up the
insolvent bank’s obligations. This feature is similar to that in the SI system
whereby future SI depositors would absorb the loss from an insolvent SI
depositor. The counterparts of SI depositors are the FHLBs.
Why, then, set up a new system when we have a similar one already in
place? There are three reasons. First, although SI depositors and FHLBs
would both hold loan assets of similar default risk, only the former could
realize loss in a failure. FHLB loans (called advances) are collateralized—
indeed, over-collateralized—with the high quality of member assets, so
that when a bank or thrift fails, no loss incurs on the advances. The loss is
shifted instead to the member’s deposit insurer. Hence, with no risk on
loans,the FHLBs have no reason to conduct due diligence.Second,in pric-
ing the advances to members, the FHLBs include the cost of borrowing
through the OF and add their own operating costs to it,as well as the costs
of the OF and those of their regulator (the Federal Housing Finance
Board).
6 But the intrinsic risk of the member—the all-important factor in
the moral-hazard issue—is not included in the price; indeed, at any given
time all members are charged the same rate by their FHLBs. Finally, since
the prospective SI depositors would already exist (see below), there would
be no need to create new entities and to pass on the costs of operating and
regulating them to banks.
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The Population of Self-Insured Depositors
Where would the SI depositors come from? Currently the usual sources of
funds to banks, thrifts, and other financial intermediaries are CDs, check-
ing accounts, and savings deposits. These sources are often referred to as
retail sources because the funds come directly from individuals, often in
small amounts through branch networks.In contrast,wholesale sources—
federal funds, jumbo CDs, brokered deposits, and FHLB advances—are
raised in large amounts, mainly from other financial institutions. Where,
in this environment, would the SI CDs fit?
Because of their leveraged position,SI CDs would not be suitable for
the small savers. A household, for example, would not likely convert the
family savings into an SI CD when, as suggested in note 5, a 10-percent
failure loss would wipe out the entire savings. Instead, the institutions
now handling large funds would be the parties most apt to invest in SI
CDs. This group includes banks, thrifts, insurance companies, credit
unions, and various types of stock and money market mutual funds.
Such institutions are already involved in intermediation, borrowing in
the financial markets and lending in the same markets after first setting
aside a portion of the borrowed funds as capital. This process allows
them to leverage up their capital and capture interest-rate spreads
between borrowing and lending rates.As SI depositors, these institutions
would likewise be leveraging their capital for the sake of rate spreads and
would be taking the same risks as all intermediaries. For example, if an
intermediary and an SI depositor both invested the same amount of
money (under the same leverage ratio) in an uninsured debt of a certain
bank that later failed, both would stand to lose an equal amount of capi-
tal.The point is that by becoming an SI depositor,an intermediary would
neither be entering a new business nor taking a risk to which it was not
accustomed.
What benefits would these intermediaries secure as SI depositors that
were not available to them already? The answer would be the option of
raising funds at rates equal to SIDFO’s cost of borrowing. No intermedi-
ary would be able to raise market funds as economically as SIDFO unless
the intermediary was able to back its borrowings 100 percent with capital
and to issue debt in quantities as large as those for SIDFO. The FDIC’s
guarantee to SIDFO’s lenders would negate the need for a 100-percent
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capital constraint,making it possible for SIDFO to borrow at government-
equivalent credit ratings. SIDFO would likely pass the quantity test
because it would be raising funds for all SI intermediaries. Consequently,
by becoming SI depositors with the ability to raise funds from SIDFO at
cost, the intermediaries could earn wider interest-rate spreads on their
investments than they would as regular intermediaries raising funds under
their own names.
Moreover, funds raised through SIDFO would likely be raised in
larger blocks than funds borrowed under an intermediary’s own name.
Consider, for example, an intermediary that currently acquired a $1 mil-
lion bank CD but used 10 separate accounts of $100,000 each to finance it.
As an SI depositor (given a 10-percent capital constraint), the intermedi-
ary could fund the purchase by combining just one of these accounts with
$900,000 of borrowing from SIDFO, thus eliminating nine of its accounts
along with their associated service costs. This line of reasoning applies
equally to banks: a bank now funding a $1 million loan through 10 sepa-
rate deposit accounts could eliminate most or all of these accounts by just
borrowing a big lump sum from a single SI depositor. Raising SI funds in
the desired amount could follow the pattern used by the FHLB system. A
bank could approach an SI intermediary for the desired amount of bor-
rowing,and when the price was agreed upon,the intermediary would turn
to SIDFO to finance the transaction. This process would not differ much
from the way banks now raise advances from their FHLB (except that, in
the case of SI funds, a bank could bargain with lenders all over the coun-
try instead of with just one district lender that charges the same regardless
of borrower creditworthiness).
Parameters and Criteria for Conversion to Self-Insurance
To find out why and when banks and investors would find it advantageous
to switch their status as depositors from FDIC-insured to self-insured,one
must stipulate certain parameters (“why?”) and recognize certain criteria
(“when?”).The parameters for “why”would consist of the capital ratios on
SI accounts,the SIDFO lending rate,and the bank-failure risk to SI depos-
itors. The criteria for “when” would be the SIDFO lending rate and the
relationship between that rate and the rates paid on existing accounts.
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Parameters for “Why?”
As noted above, the three parameters that would establish why a switch 
to SI status would be advantageous are capital requirement, the SIDFO
lending rate, and the spread between that rate and the rates on existing
accounts. For capital requirement, I assume a ratio of 10 percent, which is
equivalent to the current requirement by the regulators for well-capitalized
banks. This ratio means that a depositor could borrow $9 of funds from
SIDFO for each $1 of equity. The SIDFO lending rate would be based on
the borrowing experience of the OF in the FHLB system. In 1998 the 
interest cost on $329.4 billion of average balances of FHLB-consolidated
obligations was 5.53 percent. After considering that SIDFO would likely 
be able to borrow somewhat cheaper than OF because the guarantee of
SIDFO securities would be explicit (in contrast to the implicit guarantee 
of the OF obligations), and after including 2 basis points for the costs of
operating SIDFO (based on the OF experience), the stipulated SIDFO
lending rate is 5.50 percent. But since SI depositors would be uninsured,
they would need to adjust their returns for the risk of failure by the bank.
This risk would vary from bank to bank, but for all banks it is assumed to
be equal to the ratio of the FDIC’s provision for losses to insured deposits.
This ratio was 0.02 percent in 1998.
7
For illustration, consider a bank in which depositors currently earn
5.60 percent on CDs. After risk and taxes, these depositors should be at
earnings parity not only with depositors in other banks but also with
investors in other instruments, such as commercial paper, Treasury and
government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) issues, and tax-exempt issues—
otherwise they would not be where they are. Likewise for investors in the
other instruments: they, too, could transfer to banks if they felt they could
earn more there.
Suppose that one of these depositors switched to SI status.The depos-
itor would then earn the CD rate of 5.60 percent on the $1 of equity and,
on each of the $9 of borrowing from SIDFO, would benefit from the 10-
basis point spread between the CD rate and SIDFO’s lending rate of 5.50
percent.But the SI depositor would need to deduct for the cost of possible
failure by the bank. Suppose that in this case the perceived cost was the
same as the industry average of 2 basis points. Thus, the return (SIr) for
the SI depositor would be SIr = 1(0.0560 – 0.0002) + 9(0.0560 – 0.0550 –
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0.0002) = 6.38 percent. The depositor would now be netting 78 basis points
more than previously.
Would the SI depositor be able to keep that 78-basis point benefit?
Most likely not. The accrued extra return would place the depositor out of
equilibrium with other (non-SI) depositors in the same bank, with depos-
itors in other banks, and with depositors and investors outside the banks.
These non-SI depositors would quickly realize that they, too, could
increase returns by securing positions as SI depositors. However, a bank
has only a finite need for borrowed funds, and SI accounts could be estab-
lished only with banks.The non-SI depositors,as they competed with each
other to secure a portion of the more profitable SI deposits, could succeed
only in raising prices on SI issues and driving down their interest rates.
Rates would keep going down until equilibrium was reached between SI
and non-SI investors. This point would occur when the interest rate paid
by the bank gave the SI depositor, on a net-of-risk basis, the same return
as before the depositor’s conversion to SI status. That interest rate would
be 5.53 percent.With such a rate the depositor would effectively earn a net
return of (0.053 – 0.0002) + 9 (0.053 – 0.0550 – 0.0002) = 5.60 percent.
This would reposition the SI depositor to earnings parity with non-SI
depositors, while saving the bank 7 basis points (0.0560 – 0.0553) from
what it was paying earlier.
The underlying premise of these conclusions is that the SI depositors
would not have the power to secure more than competitive returns. There
are three reasons: (1) SI funds would constitute only a small portion of the
aggregate market for funds—a market that would include not only other
types of bank funds but also private, government, and municipal issues;
(2) the SI funds would not be an addition to, but a replacement for, bank
funds (there is no reason to expect that access to SI deposits would cause
banks to expand their assets); and (3) the demand for SI funds could
derive only from banks, whereas there would be no limit as to the parties
that could supply such funds. In other words, the demand for SI funds
would be limited and the supply unlimited, giving banks a high degree of
monopsony power and the ability to capture all of the surplus value cre-
ated from the conversion of existing deposits to SI deposits.
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Criteria for “When?”
The criteria for determining when depositors would switch to SI deposits
would be the SIDFO lending rate and where that rate stood relative to rates
paid on existing accounts. Depositors would not be interested in SI CDs
unless the rates earned on their current accounts were higher than the
SIDFO lending rate.With the rates higher,it would pay to switch to SI CDs
because the depositors would be earning positive spreads from the rates
paid for SIDFO borrowings and the rates received on SI CDs from banks.
By the same token, no bank would want to exchange any of its existing
accounts on which it was paying interest below the SIDFO lending rate for
SI accounts requiring interest above that rate. For both depositors and
banks therefore only accounts currently carrying interest above the SIDFO
lending rate would have possibility for conversion to SI deposits.
The Deposit Amounts Likely to Convert 
What amount of money are we talking about? Given the parameters and
criteria set forth above, roughly how much money in bank deposits would
be likely to become self-insured instead of FDIC-insured?
To estimate the funds that would convert to SI deposits, data are
needed on accounts within each bank now paying more than the SIDFO
lending rate of 5.50 percent. However, interest-rate data on an individual-
account basis are not available.We use,instead,the average interest-expense
ratio on deposit accounts for the bank as a whole. The interest-expense
ratio is defined as annual interest expenses on deposits divided by average
quarter-end deposit balances for the year. Banks with interest-expense
ratios above 5.50 percent would find it profitable to convert to SI CDs.
8
Call Report data were used to compute interest-expense ratios for time
and savings deposits for all banks in 1998. It turned out that numerous
banks had expense ratios above 5.50 percent, but only on time deposits.
On savings deposits, no banks had ratios above 5.50 percent. Thus, we can
infer that all SI funds would come from time deposits. As shown in Table
2,there are two types of time deposits: deposits in accounts of $100,000 or
more and deposits in accounts of less than $100,000. For time deposits of
$100,000 or more,there are 4,535 banks that had expense ratios above 5.50
percent with issues of $213.1 billion in CDs. This amount would convert
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to SI CDs and would lose the partial FDIC coverage of $100,000 per
account.For deposit accounts under $100,000,the 4,597 banks with ratios
above 5.50 percent contain funds amounting to $320.3 billion, all under
FDIC coverage.These funds would also convert to SI status and would lose
their FDIC protection.Accordingly, the sum of funds in SI accounts in the
banking system would likely come to $533.4 billion; all subject to risk at
the account-owners’ expense.
For CDs both above and below $100,000,the total converted to SI sta-
tus would be $533.4 billion, consisting of $53.3 billion of depositor equity
and $480.1 billion of borrowing from SIDFO. It should be noted that
banks switching to SI CDs would be smaller on average than banks not
switching, suggesting that most SI deposits and their benefits would be
captured by smaller banks.
Benefits Conveyed and Risks Curtailed 
As shown in Table 2, the cost to banks with CDs less than $100,000 and
expense ratios above 5.50 percent (banks that would be slated to convert to
Table 2Amounts of Time Deposits Converted to SI Deposits and 
Associated Interest Costs,1998 (in millions of dollars)
Deposit Interest Average  Number Assets 
Amounts Expenses  Interest of Banks per  Bank
Cost 
(in percent)
Banks with Expense Ratios above 5.50% 
Current Time Deposits of $100,000 or More  213,147 12,552  5.90  4,535  597 
As Converted to SI Deposits  213,147 11,851  5.56 
Current Time Deposits under $100,000 320,286 18,720  5.84  4,597  388 
As Converted to SI Deposits  320,286 17,789  5.55 
Subtotal   533,433 31,272  5.87 
As Converted to SI Deposits  533,433 29,643  5.56 
Banks with Expense Ratios below 5.50% 
Current Time Deposits of $100,000 or More  183,198 8,023  4.38  4,132  653 
Current Time Deposits under $100,000 439,052 22,513  5.13  4,109  881 
Subtotal   622,250 30,536  4.91 
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SI deposits) is $18.7 billion in interest costs in order to maintain $320.3 bil-
lion worth of CDs—a rate of interest of 5.84 percent.How much would the
banks need to pay their depositors to induce them to switch to SI CDs? 
If (again) the SI depositors could secure only competitive returns, the
answer is 5.554 percent. At that rate, the SI depositors would earn
(0.055554 – 0.0002) + 9(0.05554 – 0.0550 – 0.0002) = 5.84 percent, bring-
ing them on par with the rate earned before they switched to SI CDs and
the rates currently earned by other (non-SI) investors.The banks,however,
would have saved 28.6 basis points (0.0584 – 0.05554) as a result of the SI
switch. Likewise, it was determined that the interest cost would decline
from 5.90 percent to 5.56 percent for banks with CDs above $100,000 after
the shift to SI CDs. Combining the banking groups (those with CDs below
$100,000 and those with CDs above $100,000) results in a rate decline from
5.87 to 5.557 percent.The cost for $533.4 billion of SI CDs would fall from
$31.3 to $29.6 billion with the lower rate, thus improving the banks’ net
interest margin by 31 basis points and raising their return to equity by 3.6
percentage points (given their 8.5 percent capital ratio in 1998). In addi-
tion, banks would save conversion by meeting their funding needs with
fewer SI accounts and by not paying assessments to FDIC on SI deposits.
And the SI intermediaries would benefit by being able to borrow money
from SIDFO in larger amounts and at a lower cost.
Of the $533.4 billion in SI CDs, $391 billion would have been insured
(i.e., $320 billion of SI CDs switched from accounts below $100,000 plus
an estimated one-third of $213 billion of SI CDs from accounts above
$100,000). The FDIC would shed liability for the $391 billion of insured
bank debt (deposits) and assume liability for $480.1 billion of SIDFO debt.
Yet shifting guarantees from bank debt to SIDFO debt would dramat-
ically decrease the FDIC’s odds of incurring loss from bank failure. First,
the SI depositors’pricing of bank risk into the cost of funds would prompt
banks to lower their risk profile—for example, by improving the credit
quality of assets or taking fewer interest-rate risks. A lower risk profile
would mean fewer bank failures, hence smaller losses for the FDIC.
Moreover, the SI plan would further distance the FDIC from failure loss
by imposing additional barriers before losses could occur. At present the
FDIC can incur losses when banks default.Under my plan,however,not only
a bank must default, but also the SI depositors must become insolvent, and
 Figure 3 How SIDFO Could Become Defunct and the FDIC Incur Losses
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SIDFO must experience a loss and become defunct before the FDIC suffers a
loss.A bank becomes insolvent when its capital reaches zero.SI depositors,on
the other hand, would not default until the bank’s capital is negative and
equivalent to the SI depositors’capital requirement (10 percent in this case).
For SIDFO to incur a loss, the bank’s capital must be negative by more than
10 percent. (Note that under FDICIA, regulators could close failing banks
with positive capital ratios.) 
With respect to how SIDFO could become defunct and how the FDIC
could incur a loss, consider a scenario in which SIDFO sustains heavy
losses year after year so that it is required to increase its lending rate in
order to recoup its losses. Since SIDFO would be a monopolist, it would
face the entire demand curve for SI lending (Figure 3).As the lending rate
moves from P1 to P2 along the price axis in order to recover the SIDFO
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losses, some SI depositors along the downward-sloping demand curve
would be compelled to drop out of the system (from Q1 to Q2). Other
depositors would remain in the system until the lending rate rises again
before dropping out (from Q2 to Q3). As the SIDFO losses continue to
mount,the lending rate would climb to the point where the demand curve
touches the price line (P4). At this point all SI depositors would drop out
of the system and SIDFO would become defunct. The FDIC would be
liable for all losses sustained by SIDFO during the last year of its life.
Summary and Conclusions
9
Deposit insurance renders deposits at different banks equally attractive
and perfectly secure.This effect can lead to unjustified risk taking by banks
because raising funds for riskier,higher-yielding assets costs no more than
raising funds for less risky, lower-yielding assets. One way to limit this
problem is to rely on uninsured depositors to price bank risk into banks’
cost of funds.
This brief offers a plan to increase the amount of uninsured deposits.
At present there is one government-guaranteed lender (depositor), one
recipient of guaranteed credit (bank), and one level of risk capital (bank’s
equity) protecting the guarantor (FDIC). In the plan offered here, the
recipient of the guaranteed credit would still be the bank. However, no
loan guarantee would be given to depositors with a bank. Instead, the
guarantee would apply to investors who bought the securities of a central
financing office (SIDFO) that made equity-secured loans to financial
intermediaries (SI depositors). The intermediaries would then invest the
proceeds in uninsured bank deposits. Under these terms, the government
would get more protection against loss (SI depositors’ capital) and the SI
depositors would have to monitor their banks aptly and demand premi-
ums based on risk to avoid loss and earn a competitive return.
Significantly, unlike other proposals (e.g., subordinated notes), this
plan does not mandate that banks issue and assume any specified amount
of SI-deposit liabilities. A bank would issue SI CDs only if the cost would
be less than raising funds from other sources. My analysis indicates that
only the larger time deposits paying interest above the SIDFO lending rate
would meet the criteria for switching to SI deposits. Savings and similar
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retail deposits would not qualify because banks could secure such funds at
a cost below the SIDFO rate. I estimate that some $533 billion of time
deposits would convert to SI CDs—about 10 percent of all the funds in the
banking system in 1998.The interest cost on the SI CDs would be less than
the cost of the funds that would exchange into SI CDs. The reason for the
lower cost would be, basically, the centralized SIDFO financing arrange-
ment.The large-scale,FDIC-guaranteed borrowing of SIDFO would effec-
tively ensure that banks could raise SI funds at a price close to funds raised
under the more cost-efficient, direct-loan method.
Another aspect of the plan relates to insured-deposit funding and
undue risks for deposit insurers. Some proposals (generally referred to as
narrow-bank proposals) limit an insurer’s risk by regulating which banks
can insure deposits and what use is made of the deposits. From this per-
spective, SIDFO may be seen as a huge narrow bank: it would take in
insured deposits and would deliver them to banks via the SI middleman
without raising concerns for insurers about failure risks and moral hazard.
Such risks and worries would become the exclusive possession of SI depos-
itors. Unlike other narrow-bank designs, SIDFO would not impose any
limitations on where the banks could invest the borrowed SI funds.Again,
SI depositors would apply any constraints through their risk premiums.
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Notes
1. Brewer (1995); Kane (1989); McKenzie, Cole, and Brown (1992).
2. To learn more about FDICIA and its effects, see Lemieux (1993) and
Benston and Kaufman (1997).
3. See Office of Management and Budget (1991).
4. These examples also demonstrate how pricing according to risk would
be arrived at.
5. For example, under a 10 percent capital ratio, an SI depositor would
lose 100 percent of posted capital if the bank failed and depositors lost
10 cents on the dollar. If the loss exceeded 10 cents on the dollar, the
excess would fall on future SI depositors through the higher SIDFO
rate, instead of the FDIC rate.
6. All FHLB statistics and references are from Federal Home Loan Bank
System, 1999 Financial Report (www.fhfb.gov).
7. For this assumption to be meaningful in determining the switch
between SI and non-SI depositors, we must also stipulate that, in
terms of depositor preference, SI depositors would be equally senior
to non-SI depositors. Junior status would transfer the risk away from
non-SI depositors, rendering the failure risk ratio assumed above
pointless.
8. Although a bank would be considered to have switched all accounts to
SI status, its average expense ratio of 5.50 percent may well incorpo-
rate as many accounts earning more than 5.50 percent that merit a
switch to SI status as accounts earning less than 5.50 percent that do
not merit a switch.As noted in the text,it may be more precise to esti-
mate the likelihood of switching on the basis of individual accounts
but such data do not exist. I therefore adopt the average-expense
method, under the assumption that the accounts with average ratios
below 5.50 percent that are wrongly assumed to switch to SI CDs
would likely be offset by the accounts with average ratios above 5.50
percent that are assumed not to switch.
9. The author notes that his conclusions do not necessarily reflect the
views of the FDIC.
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